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Abstract— With the proliferation of Cloud-based services, 
Federated Identity Management (FIM) has gained considerable 
attention in recent years. It is considered as a promising 
approach to facilitate secure resource sharing between 
collaborating partners in the Cloud. However, current FIM 
frameworks such as OpenID, SAML, Liberty Alliance, 
Shibboleth and WS-Federation do not define a suitable trust 
model to allow dynamic and agile federation establishment. 
Hence, they cannot be deployed in dynamic and open 
environments like Cloud Computing.  In this paper, we address 
this issue by presenting a new dynamic trust model that fulfils 
Cloud requirements. The proposed model introduces the theory 
of Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) into modelling and evaluating 
unknown entities trustworthiness in FIM systems. 
Keywords—Cloud Computing, Trust, Trust model, Federated 
Identity Management, Fuzzy Cognitive Maps. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The exponential growth of Cloud applications is putting 
the IT security infrastructure under strain, in particular about 
Identity and Access Management (IAM) [1]. With this model, 
IT staffs face issues of managing and securing a whole arsenal 
of user’s accounts, identifiers and passwords in a highly 
dynamic, multi-tenancy, insecure, and open environment. 
Identity Federation may seem like a promising approach to 
mitigate these identity management issues. It provides open, 
standardised and secure methods for a Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP) to identify users who are authenticated by an Identity 
Provider (IdP) [2].  
This approach has many benefits for Cloud environments 
[3], such as increased simplicity by using cross-domain SSO 
(Single Sign-On) features, Seamless access to resources and 
reduced administrative costs of user accounts. However, 
current FIM frameworks like OpenID, SAML (Security 
Assertion Markup Language), Liberty Alliance, Shibboleth 
and WS-Federation are limited by the complexity of the 
underlying trust models that need to be set before inter-domain 
cooperation [4]. All these frameworks are based on pre-
configured and static Circle of Trust (CoT), in which entities 
must establish trust relationships before the interactions take 
place [5]. This pre-configured CoT is usually hard to scale and 
not technically extendable which results in forming of closed 
communities [6]. In the case of OpenID, Relying Parties (RPs 
or CSP) must decide for themselves which OpenID Providers 
are trustworthy [7] because there is no trust model specified 
by this protocol to manage trust between these entities [8].  
Furthermore, all these systems are suffering from many 
challenges such as lack of security and privacy [9], and 
limitations regarding interoperability and deployment [8]. As a 
result, existing FIM frameworks cannot be deployed in Cloud 
Computing which is a highly dynamic and open environment. 
In this model, trust between parties involved in a federation 
process should be managed dynamically without the need for 
pre-configured CoT. In this paper, we aim to address in 
particular this issue by proposing a new dynamic trust model 
that helps the successful integration of FIM systems and Cloud 
Computing. The proposed model introduces the Fuzzy 
Cognitive Maps (FCM) tool into modelling and evaluating the 
trust relationship between unknown entities in FIM systems. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II 
reviews and analyzes some related works and their limitations. 
Section III presents basic concepts about FCMs.  After that, 
the proposed model is presented in Section IV. Then an 
application example of this model is presented in Section V. 
Finally, section VI reviews the content of the paper and 
presents the conclusions. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Nowadays, dynamic FIM has become an interesting 
research area and several dynamic FIM systems have already 
evolved [4]. However, this section will be focused on 
representative systems for Cloud Computing environment as 
this is the scope of this research work.  
In this context, a generic extension for the SMAL standard 
was proposed in [10]. The proposed extension facilitates the 
creation of federation relationships in a dynamic way between 
unknown entities and minimizes the dependency on previous 
configuration, making entities more autonomous and capable 
of taking trust decisions. However, this approach has many 
implementation issues because SAML is basically designed 
for limited-scale identity federation. Furthermore, it does not 
resolve problems of interoperability, privacy, and deployment. 
Authors in [5] have proposed a dynamic trust policy language 
that allows untrusted CSP to join automatically an existing 
CoT by negotiation. The policy language extends the 
Attribute-based Trust Negotiation Language (ATNL) to 
support dynamic trust management for Single Sign-On (SSO). 
This approach provides a flexible and dynamic trust 
management system. However, this policy language suffers 
from many privacy and deployment problems. In [11], authors 
have proposed a centralized trust management component 
named TSP (Trust Service Provider), which can automatically 
establish trust relationship between federation parties in 
runtime. So, when an organization wants to join a federation, 
it only needs to register each of its FIM parties on the TSP and 
then communicate securely with all other parties within the 
federation. The centralized architecture of this model 
decreases significantly their scalability since the list of trusted 
entities could become very large as the number of parties 
increases. In addition, this model has many security 
challenges. Recently, several Dynamic FIM works based on 
Cloud Identity Broker-model have emerged [6], [12] and [13]. 
This model introduces a trusted third party as a trust broker to 
manage trust relationships among services in-Cloud. With this 
trustable intermediary, the transitive federation could be 
established dynamically and to a broader range of Cloud 
services, reducing significantly the cost of trust established 
with external Cloud services. However, the broker brings 
serious security and privacy risks because identity data are 
stored and processed in the public Cloud. 
This study reveals that none of the studied systems has 
addressed all the trust management aspects related to security, 
privacy, scalability, interoperability, implementation and 
deployment. Each of these mechanisms addresses one aspect 
of trust but not others. Each system is designed specifically for 
a particular application used for specific purposes. As a result, 
there is a strong need for an efficient trust model to solve the 
issue of dynamic identity federation in Cloud Computing. The 
main goal of this work is to address this trust issue by 
presenting a new dynamic trust model. The later used the 
theory of Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) in the modelling and 
evaluating the trust relationship between unknown entities in 
FIM systems.  
III. FUZZY COGNITIVE MAPS (FCM) 
FCM is typically signed fuzzy weighted digraph.  It 
consists of nodes which represent variable concepts of the 
modelled system, and signed weighted arcs or edges which 
describe the causal relationships between these concepts and 
interconnect them [14]. Concepts represent key factors and 
attributes of the modelled system, such as inputs, outputs, 
states, events and goals [15]. Each signed weighted arc Wij 
represents the degree to which the concept Ci influences the 
concept Cj. It is described by a non-linear transformation 
function f(Ci, Cj) which takes values in the [-1, 1] interval  
[14]. The value of Wij can express positive (Wij>0) or negative 
(Wij<0) or no relationship (Wij=0) between the concepts Ci and 
Cj. The sign of Wij indicates whether the relationship between 
the two concepts is direct or inverse [15].  
The FCM is represented in a (n x n) weight connection 
matrix called W [14], where n is the number of concepts 
(nodes). The row i represents the causality between concept Ci 
and all other concepts in the map [15]. The state vector called 
A(1xn) represents current values of the n concepts (nodes) in a 
particular iteration. The value of each concept is obtained by 
computing the influence of other concepts to the specific 
concept using the calculation rule of equation (1) [15]. 
Ai(t) = 𝑓 ( ∑ Aj(t − 1). wji
n
i=1,i≠j
)            (1) 
Where Ai(t) is the value of concept Ci at time t,  
Aj(t-1) is the value of concept Cj at time t-1, and f is a 
threshold function to convert the output of each computation 
into the range [0, 1]. 
IV. PROPOSED MODEL 
First, we need to explain the core idea of the proposed trust 
model. As can be seen in figure 1, each user gets his identity 
from a trusted IdP. If the CSP does not trust this IdP (1), the 
CSP and IdP can use the proposed trust model to compute the 
trustworthiness of each other in real time (2). Based upon the 
final trust value, the CSP decides to establish a connection with 
the target IdP and vice versa. When “Trustworthiness-
evaluation” algorithm is successful, a trusted connection is 
automatically established between the CSP and IdP (3). 
 
Fig. 1. The general architecture  of the proposed model 
The proposed trust model is described in graphical 
illustration using the FCM inference to handle uncertainty and 
fuzziness in trust. Concepts are entity’s trustworthiness and its 
influencing features in the context of FIM, and weighted arcs 
represent the impact of the trust influencing factors to the 
trustee’s trustworthiness. 
A. Trust features in FIM 
Trust is the most complex relationship among entities in 
distributed computing environments because it is extremely 
subjective, context-dependent, non-symmetric, uncertain, and 
partially transitive [16]. It is founded on particular beliefs or 
features of trustworthiness that an entity (trustor) has about 
another entity (trustee) [16]. According to [17], [18] and [19] 
the commonly relevant beliefs which have a direct influence on 
the entity’s trustworthiness are summarized in table 1:  
TABLE I.  BELIEFS OF TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Trust feature Description 
C1: Ability   
It refers to the perceived competence level of an 
entity to perform some intended behaviour [39]. It 
allows the trustor to dynamically form an opinion 
about another entity [19] 
C2: Intention 
or willingness 
to trust 
It is the extent to which one party is willing to 
depend on the other party in a given situation with a 
feeling of relative security, even though negative 
consequences are possible [16]. 
C3: Privacy 
It is the ability of an entity to determine whether, 
when, and to whom information about itself is to be 
released or disclosed [19]. “A privacy policy has a 
positive relationship with trust”. 
C4: Security 
It refers to the trustor’s perception on the trustee’s 
ability in fulfilling security requirements [18], such 
as authentication, authorization, integrity and 
availability. 
C5: 
Dependability 
It refers to the trustor’s perception on the trustee’s 
ability in fulfilling reliability, maintainability, 
usability, availability and safety requirements [18]. 
In the FIM context, there is no unified standard to select 
trust factors. There are only few research projects dealing with 
analyzing and identifying trust factors in FIM such as [20], 
[21], [22] and [23]. Based on these works, we have proposed 
the following trust factors (Table 2). 
TABLE II.  TRUST FACTORS IN FIM 
Trust feature Description 
C6: Reputation 
Reputation can be derived from IdP or CSP past 
experience or opinions reported by third parties. 
It can be used to guide behaviours of potential 
partners in future situations. 
C7: User privacy 
The IdP must preserve the user privacy by using 
anonymous or pseudonymous identifiers and 
allowing the user to choose and provide consent 
regarding the attributes that it wants to release to 
the CSP [20]. 
C8: Limited 
Disclosure 
The SP will ask only for the minimum number of 
user attributes that are required to access any of 
its services and will use them only for the stated 
purpose(s). 
C9: 
Communications 
The claims holding user attributes must be 
digitally signed and exchanged between the IdP 
and the CSP over secure channels by using 
secure communication protocols such as SSL. 
C10: 
Confidentiality 
The IdP has satisfactory mechanisms for 
registering, storing and issuing user attributes 
safely and securely. 
C11: Integrity 
Ensuring the integrity and the quality of the 
identity credentials by using an audit and 
verification mechanism.  
C12: 
Availability 
Ensuring that a system  is operational and that it 
is accessible to those who need to use it; 
adequate measures should be in place to prevent 
and detect the malfunctions of the system 
C13: 
Authentication 
The IdP registers users securely, authenticates 
them and releases attributes as per requirements. 
C14: 
Authorization 
The SP adheres to the non-disclosure of 
attributes, not abuses the released attributes, and 
maintains agreed access control policies. 
C15: Prior 
transactions 
Through prior interactions history, CSP (IdP) 
may evaluate trust level given to IdP (CSP). Lack 
of prior transactions may contribute to fragile 
trust among unknown parties. 
C16: 
Interoperability 
Interoperability refers to the degree of technical, 
operational and legal interoperability between the 
CSP and IdP.  
The trust relationship between the IdP and CSP in 
Dynamic FIM is bidirectional; each entity must decide to trust 
or not the other entity. The IdP needs to confirm if it is secure 
to collaborate with an unknown CSP. Similarly, the CSP will 
have to decide if it is secure to accept authentication 
statements issued by a specific IdP. So, the trustworthiness of 
each entity must be identified. Table 3 presents the causal 
relationships between the previous trust features for both CSP 
and IdP. These causal relationships have been identified based 
on reported works [18, 23]. Sign (+) means feature 1 is 
positively influenced by feature 2. If feature 2 has a positive 
value, feature 1 increases, otherwise it decreases.    
TABLE III.  CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TRUST FEATURES 
Trust Features CSP IdP 
Ability  (+) Security, (+) Privacy, (+) Prior transactions. 
Intention  (+) Reputation. 
Security 
 (+)  Privacy  
 (+)  Dependability  
 (+)  Limited Disclosure  
 (+)  Authorization 
 (+)  Availability  
 (+)  Communications 
 (+)  Privacy 
 (+)  Dependability 
 (+)  Confidentiality 
 (+)  Authentication 
 (+)  Integrity 
 (+)  Availability 
 (+)  Communication 
Privacy 
 (+) Security 
 (+)  Communications 
 (+) Limited Disclosure  
 (+) Authorization 
 (+)  security   
 (+)  user privacy 
 (+)  
communications  
 (+)  confidentiality 
 (+)  Integrity 
 (+)  authentication 
Dependability  (+) Availability, (+) Interoperability. 
Reputation 
 (+) security 
 (+) privacy  
 (+) limited disclosure  
 (+) authorization  
 (+) prior transactions.  
 (+) security  
 (+) privacy  
 (+) prior 
transactions. 
User privacy Non-influencing factor 
 (+)  Integrity 
 (+)  authentication 
 (+)  confidentiality  
 (+)  communication  
Integrity and 
confidentiality 
Non-influencing factor  (+) authentication  
Authentication Non-influencing factor  (+) communications  
Prior transactions  (+) communication  
Trustworthiness 
 (+) Security, (+) Privacy, (+) Ability, (+) 
Intention,  
(+) Dependability. 
B. Trust modelling using FCM 
As shown in figures 2 and 3, the proposed trust model is 
described as a direct graph G(C, E). Where C= {C1, C2, … , 
C17} is a finite set of nodes, and E={ eij ׀  i, j ∈ C, E ⊆ C×C  
| / Wijϵ[-1, 1]} is a finite set of edges. The graph contains three 
layers of nodes. The lowest nodes (C6, …., C16) are the 
concepts which have an indirect influence on the entity’s 
trustworthiness, the middle nodes (C1, …, C5) are the trust 
features which have a direct influence on the entity’s 
trustworthiness, and C17 is the output node which represents the 
final trust value. Based on this value, the CSP decides to 
establish a connection with the target IdP and vice versa.  
 
Fig. 2. MAP of the Causal relationships from the CSP 
 Fig. 3. MAP of the Causal relationships from the IdP. 
Based on previous maps (figures 2, 3), an initial version of 
weight matrix can be built for both CSP and IdP (Tables 4 and 
5). 
TABLE IV.  INITIAL WEIGHT MATRIX OF CAUSAL  
RELATIONSHIPS FROM THE CSP 
 
TABLE V.  INITIAL WEIGHT MATRIX OF CAUSAL  
RELATIONSHIPS FROM THE CSP 
 
C. Trustworthiness evaluation algorithm 
The pseudo-code bellow is used to obtain the final trust 
value based on the initial values of the state vector A initial (0).  
Algorithm: Trustworthiness-evaluation 
 Input 
• State Vector Ainitial (C1, C2, ….Cn). (t=0) 
• Weight matrix Winitial [Wij]  / i,j={1,…., n} 
Output 
• Trust/Distrust decision and the state vector Afinal(t).  
Begin 
1. Read  State vector Ainitial (0) and the weight matrix Winitial 
2. For iteration step K 
a. Update the State vector according to equation (1) 
b. If (A(t+1) = A(t)), stop, Else go to step 2 
3. Return the final Values of the state vector Afinal (t) and the 
final value of trust (C17). 
4. Return Trust/Distrust decision 
End  
V. APPLICATION EXAMPLE: CLOUD APIS 
In this section, we present an application example in order 
to illustrate the feasibility of our trust model. The application 
example focuses on “insecure Cloud APIs” (Application 
Programming Interfaces) which is one of the three major 
security concerns in Cloud Computing [24]. CSPs publish a 
set of APIs that customers can use to manage and interact with 
cloud services. Service provisioning, management, 
orchestration, and monitoring are all performed using these 
interfaces [25]. The security and availability of general cloud 
services are depending on the security of these basic APIs 
[24]. Most Cloud players such as Google, Amazon, Salesforce 
and Microsoft use OAuth and OpenID protocols to secure 
their APIs [25]. However, there is no trust model specified by 
these open protocols to manage trust between CSPs and IdPs 
(OpenID or OAuth Providers) [7]. CSPs must decide by 
themselves which IdPs are trustworthy. Many companies 
believe that OpenID implementation lacks the necessary 
confidence level in user identity trust [7]. Poor management of 
trust in these protocols increase significantly many security 
and privacy issues [26] such as identity theft, unauthorized 
account access, embarrassment, Phishing, social engineering, 
replay attacks using old identity assertions, data breach, man-
in-the-middle attacks, session hijacking etc. Our trust model is 
an effective method to enhance security and privacy in Cloud 
APIs by determining the trustworthiness level of the IdP by 
using the following method. An average value of the 
trustworthiness is computed as follow:  
𝐴𝑉𝑅(𝑥) = {
0, 𝑥 < 0.5 
𝑥 − 0.5
0.5
×100%, 𝑥 ≥ 0.5
 
Where, x is the final value of trust (C17) obtained using the 
algorithm described in section 4.C.  If AVR(x) ≥ 50% the IdP 
is consider as trusted. Else, it is considered as untrusted. Each 
API can define their proper thresholds according to their 
security policy.  
As can be seen in Fig. 4, before calling the API, the user 
(application) must obtain a temporary access token from a 
trusted IdP (1). Then, the user calls the API by adding the 
access token to the parameters of the request (2).  The token is 
signed in order to prove the identity of the issuing authority. 
Before evaluating the token legitimacy and gives its decision 
to allow or deny access to the protected resources, the API 
compute the trustworthiness level of the IdP (3). If the trust 
level is insufficient, the API refuses authentication statements 
issued by this IdP, otherwise it goes to the evaluation of the 
token legitimacy with the IdP. The proposed extension can 
make Cloud APIs more secure and protect them against 
malicious IdPs. 
 
Fig. 4. The Trust Management model for Cloud APIs. 
VI. CONCLUSION & PERSPECTIVES 
The poor management of trust in existing FIM solutions 
causes the major integration hurdles of FIM systems and 
Cloud Computing. The problem of establishing a trust 
relationship between unknown entities is not covered by these 
solutions. In this paper a new dynamic trust model based on 
FCMs has been proposed. The effectiveness of the FCM 
inference tool has been widely proven through the literature to 
model uncertainty of trust. It suitably represents the causal 
relationships that exist among trust and its influencing factors 
in the context of FIM. This approach allows the dynamic 
creation of federations based on the resulting trust value which 
can make Cloud service provisioning and user interaction 
easier and more flexible. As a result, FIM systems will be more 
scalable and flexible to successfully deploy in Cloud 
Computing environments.  
As future work, we expect to apply the proposed model in 
a real Cloud environment in order to carry out tests and 
experiments. The implementation of this model is actually in 
progress. 
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